Fourth, note that the claim here is that some of our torn decisions are L-free. Libertarianism is perfectly compatible with the claim that some of our torn decisions are causally determined by prior events; e. Fifth and finally, it's important to get clear on the kind of indeterminacy that's required for torn decisions to be L-free. This sort of indeterminacy can be defined as follows:. A torn decision is wholly undetermined at the moment of choice—or, for short, TDW-undetermined —if and only if the actual objective moment-of-choice probabilities of the various reasons-based tied-for-best options being chosen match the phenomenological probabilities—or what the probabilities seem to us to be—so that these moment-of-choice probabilities are all more or less even, given the complete state of the universe and all of the laws of nature, and the choice occurs without any other significant causal inputs, i.
It's important to note that this sort of indeterminacy is compatible with various features of the decision being fully determined. Suppose, e. It could be determined that i I'm going to make a torn decision i.
All of this is perfectly consistent with the decision being TDW-undetermined. All that needs to be undetermined, in order for the choice to be TDW-undetermined, is which tied-for-best option is chosen. It's also important to note that TDW-indeterminacy lies at one end of a spectrum of possible cases and that there are degrees of the kind of indeterminacy I'm talking about here.
To see what I've got in mind by this, suppose that Ralph makes a torn decision to order chocolate pie instead of apple pie. Since this is a torn decision, we know that given all of Ralph's conscious reasons and thought, he feels completely neutral between his two tied-for-best options.
But it might be that, unbeknownst to Ralph, there are external factors—things that are external to Ralph's conscious reasons and thought e. Indeed, there's a spectrum of possibilities here. At one end of the spectrum, which option is chosen is TDW-undetermined, so that the objective moment-of-choice probabilities of the two tied-for-best options being chosen are 0.
At the other end of the spectrum, the choice is fully determined—i. And in between, there are possible cases where the objective moment-of-choice probabilities are neither 0. In order to fully define thin libertarianism, I need to say a few words about a well-known philosophical argument against libertarianism.
The argument I have in mind can be put like this:. The randomness argument : Even if our decisions are undetermined in the way that's needed for L-freedom, it doesn't matter because undetermined events are just random events. In other words, they occur by chance —i. Thus, if we introduce an undetermined event into a decision-making process, that would seem to either a increase the level of randomness in that process or b leave the level of randomness alone if the indeterminacy ends up not mattering.
So it's hard to see how the introduction of an undetermined event into a decision-making process could increase non -randomness.
Thus, since this is precisely what's needed for L-freedom, it seems that we don't have L-freedom; indeed, it seems that L-freedom is impossible 6. I think that libertarians can respond to this argument by arguing for the following thesis:.
If we take TDW-indeterminism to be the view that some of our torn are TDW-undetermined, and if we assume as I am here—see above that libertarianism is true if and only if some of our torn decisions are L-free, then CLT can be put more succinctly as follows:. If CLT is true, then it turns the randomness argument completely on its head.
The randomness argument says that indeterminacy implies randomness. CLT, on the other hand, says that the right kind of indeterminacy implies non -randomness. If this is right and if I'm right that libertarianism is true if and only if our torn decisions are L-free , then the question of whether libertarianism is true reduces to the purely empirical question of whether TDW-indeterminism is true. I argued for CLT at length in Balaguer I can't rehearse all of my arguments here, but I'd like to say a few words about one of them.
If indeterminism is true, then there are at least some physical events that are undetermined. These undetermined events are events that determine how the universe will evolve. So, for example, suppose that I'm going to be in an ice cream parlor tonight and that at some specific time—say, p. If indeterminism is true—and, in particular, if it's not yet determined whether I'm going to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream—then there's some undetermined event E or some collection of undetermined events, but let's simplify and suppose that it's a single event that will occur between now and pm tonight that will determine whether the universe evolves in an I-get-chocolate-ice-cream way or an I-get-vanilla-ice-cream way.
Now notice the following crucial point: if TDW-indeterminism is true, then E is my torn decision. In other words, the undetermined physical event that, so to speak, spins the universe off in an I-get-chocolate-ice-cream direction, instead of an I-get-vanilla-ice-cream direction, just is my conscious decision—i. This follows straightforwardly from TDW-indeterminism together with the mind-brain materialist assumption that decisions are physical events 7 So if TDW-indeterminism is true, then we get the result that my conscious decision is the undetermined physical event that settles whether the universe evolves in an I-get-chocolate-ice-cream way or an I-get-vanilla-ice-cream way.
I argued in Balaguer and Balaguer in progress that if this is true—if our torn decisions are the undetermined events that settle which of our tied-for-best options get chosen—then i our torn decisions are appropriately non-random e.
But I can't argue for all of these points here. Given everything I've said, we can define thin libertarianism as the view that TDW-indeterminism is true—i. I think that thin libertarianism captures the backward -looking claim that libertarians should endorse. But it doesn't make any forward -looking claims; in particular, it's compatible with the epiphenomenalist thesis that our torn decisions don't play any role in causing our actions. If libertarians want to avoid this result, then they need to define a kind of libertarian freedom that requires non-epiphenomenalism.
We can do this as follows:. A person P is NEL-free short for non-epiphenomenal libertarian free if and only if at least some of P's torn decisions are such that a they're TDW-undetermined and hence also appropriately non-random and L-free , and b they're not inappropriately epiphenomenal—i. But I'm assuming mind-brain materialism here, and so while it's true that torn decisions are mental events, on the view I'm articulating, they're also physical events, presumably neural events.
So this first worry doesn't even get off the ground. But there's another worry you might have about our torn decisions being epiphenomenal. You might worry that a there are wholly non-conscious neural events that occur before our torn decisions that are common causes of our torn decisions and the corresponding actions, and b our torn decisions aren't causally upstream from our actions in the right way.
In other words, you might worry that the causal map looks like this:. If this is how things work in our brains, then it would seem to be freedom-undermining in an obvious sort of way. Thus, I'll assume that this is the relevant worry about our torn decisions being epiphenomenal. And so I'll take clause b of the definition of NEL-freedom to say that the torn decisions in question are not epiphenomenal in this way.
In other words, it's the view that at least some of our torn decisions are a TDW-undetermined and, hence, L-free and b not epiphenomenal in the above way. NE-libertarianism has a backward looking claim namely, TDW-indeterminism and a forward-looking claim non-epiphenomenalism.
These are both empirical claims, and so NE-libertarianism could be undermined by empirical findings that suggested that one or both of its empirical claims aren't true. The question I now want to ask is whether the empirical considerations discussed in section 2—i.
In particular, it seems to me that all five of the forward-looking epiphenomenalism-based worries about free will from section 2 i. In other words, the only anti-free-will considerations that I discussed in section 2 that aren't transparently irrelevant to the question of whether we're NEL-free are B4 and B5—i. I'll discuss those studies in sections 4. The vast majority of our actions are not caused by—or, indeed, even preceded by—conscious choices.
For example, when I take the 43rd step on my stroll through the park, I do not decide to do that in any interesting sense of the term; and the same thing is true of the vast majority of my actions. We often have no idea why we do what we do.
We often have to infer what our reasons were for some of the actions we perform. We often confabulate reasons for our actions, after the fact. Many of our actions aren't caused by reasons at all—we just do them. Conscious awareness of action often lags behind action—e.
We can sometimes be duped into thinking that we performed actions that we didn't perform; and we can sometimes be duped into thinking that we didn't perform actions that we did perform. We are not directly aware of the causal link between our decisions and our actions; the claim that there's a causal link here is an empirical claim that requires evidence.
We do not have any good non-empirical reason to believe that our torn decisions are TDW-undetermined; indeed, for all we know, it could be that all of our torn decisions are fully determined by events that took place before we were born; the claim that TDW-indeterminism is true—i.
Many of our actions and, indeed, many of our torn decisions are causally influenced by subconscious mental states and non-mental neural events that we're not aware of at all.
Many of our actions and, indeed, many of our torn decisions are causally influenced by situational factors like mood. Our torn decisions can be manipulated by external stimuli, e.
Even if we assume that torn decisions can be causally influenced by magnetic stimulation to the brain, it doesn't follow that ordinary torn decisions— without magnetic stimulation—aren't TDW-undetermined. Here's an analogy: even if we can weight a coin to make it extremely likely that it will come up heads when we toss it, it doesn't follow that the outcomes of fair coin tosses are determined by prior events; it could be that the objective probability of getting heads on a fair coin toss is usually about 0.
Or again: even if our torn decisions can be influenced by alien manipulation, it doesn't follow that when aliens aren't present, our torn decisions aren't TDW-undetermined and L-free. All of these claims are perfectly compatible All of these claims are perfectlywith NE-libertarianism. This is entirely obvious—there's simply nothing in NE-libertarianism that says anything that's even remotely incompatible with any of the above claims.
But the whole point of F1-F5 and B1-B3—i. Thus, considerations F1-F5 and B1-B3 are all entirely irrelevant to the question of whether NE-libertarianism is true—i. If we keep these two points in mind when we read through claims , it becomes very clear that there's nothing in any of these claims that's incompatible with NE-libertarianism.
Moreover, it also becomes clear that the anti-free-will argument here—the one based on claims like , or considerations like F1-F5 and B1-B3—is a straw-man argument.
It's directed against a bizarre view of human beings that no one could take seriously. The NE-libertarian that I have in mind wants to respond to this argument by saying something like the following:. We're not idiots. We don't think that human beings are ideal or event close to ideal agents. We, of course, think that human beings are sometimes causally influenced by subconscious mental states and non-conscious brain processes that they're not aware of; and we, of course, think that human beings are often completely in the dark about why they do lots of what they do; and likewise for all of the claims that you're making here about human beings—we don't need to deny any of these claims.
All we're saying—all that needs to be true in order for human beings to be NEL-free—is that at least some or our torn decisions are TDW-undetermined and non-epiphenomenal. And this is perfectly compatible with claims and considerations F1-F5 and B1-B3.
It's important to note here that NE-libertarians can admit that some of our torn decisions are causally determined by factors that we're completely unaware of. Indeed, it seems to me that we have strong empirical reasons to believe that many of our torn decisions are causally influenced by factors that we're not aware of.
But as far as I can see, we don't have any good reason to think that all of our torn decisions are causally influenced by such factors. To bring this out, consider an ordinary case in which an ordinary person—say, Ralph—makes a torn decision to order chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla.
Do considerations like F1-F5 and B1-B3 give us good reason to think that this decision—made very calmly and consciously—wasn't TDW-undetermined and non-epiphenomenal? The evidence we have just doesn't support this claim. Think of a typical day; you might make torn decisions about whether to have fruit or toast for breakfast, whether to take a walk before going to work, whether to work through lunch or go out to a restaurant, whether to work late or go to a concert, and so on.
Does the existing evidence in particular, the evidence concerning considerations like F1-F5 and B1-B3 really support the claim that none of these decisions is TDW-undetermined and non-epiphenomenal?
The answer, I think, is that it does nothing of the sort. It supports the claim that we're often influenced by subconscious factors; but it just doesn't support the claim that none of our torn decisions is TDW-undetermined and non-epiphenomenal. Indeed, the existing evidence seems perfectly consistent with the thesis that a significant percentage of our torn decisions are TDW-undetermined and non-epiphenomenal.
And that's all that NE-libertarians need 8. You're not appreciating the fact that when we discover something about the way the mind-brain works in specific cases, we can infer that it works that way in all cases. So, for example, if consciousness is sluggish in some cases, then it's presumably sluggish in all cases. After all, it's not as if the neural processes involved in our conscious thinking can suddenly speed up.
I want to say two things in response to this objection, one related to the fact that a NE-libertarians think that we need to focus on torn decisions in particular , and one related to the fact that b NE-libertarians claim only that some of our torn decisions are TDW-undetermined and L-free.
Point a is enough to give us a response to the worry about the sluggishness of consciousness. NE-libertarians obviously don't think that the neural processes involved in our conscious thinking sometimes speed up; rather, their position is that these processes don't need to speed up in order to be causally relevant to our torn decisions in the manner required for the truth of NE-libertarianism.
Because torn decisions are very different from, e. Consciousness can't keep up with things like speech processing and emergency steering maneuvers; but there's no reason to think that it can't keep up with torn decisions. So we can't infer from the fact that consciousness is too sluggish to play a causal role in speech processing and emergency steering maneuvers to the conclusion that consciousness is too sluggish to play a causal role in torn decisions.
So it's not that NE-libertarians are failing to take note of the fact that results obtained about specific cases generalize to other cases; it's rather that NE-libertarians are pointing out that the generalizing inference doesn't go through in the specific case at issue here because there are relevant disanalogies between torn decisions and, e. Analogous points can be made about many of the other empirical results at issue in connection with considerations F1-F5 and B1-B3.
But there's a second point that NE-libertarians need to make in order to provide a full response to the above objection.
The second point concerns the psychology of our torn decisions rather than the neural processes involved in those decisions. The point is this: a there's no good reason to think that if some of our torn decisions are causally influenced by subconscious mental states or events in ways that are incompatible with TDW-indeterminism , then all of them are; and b the sum total of the evidence that we presently have does not justify an inference to a claim of universality here.
Now, I am not claiming that we could never be in position to infer from individual cases to a universal claim here. If we had the ability to locate torn decisions in our brains and to observe the causal antecedents of those decisions—and these are obviously things that we can't do right now—then if we observed a random and reasonably large sample of ordinary torn decisions and found that in all observed cases, our torn decisions were causally influenced by subconscious mental states or events in ways that were incompatible with TDW-indeterminism , then it would be very rational for us to conclude that this was true in general.
And so it would be rational for us to conclude in this scenario that NE-libertarianism was false. But we're just not in this situation right now. We don't have the ability to look at a random sample of ordinary torn decisions and determine whether they're causally influenced by subconscious mental states or events in ways that are incompatible with TDW-indeterminism. And so while we've got good reason to think that some of our torn decisions are causally influenced by subconscious mental states or events, we're just not in a position to rationally infer that all of them are.
Perhaps the most famous arguments against free will that have been generated by work in psychology and neuroscience are based on the work of Benjamin Libet. In this subsection, I'll explain why Libet's results don't give us any good reason to doubt NE-libertarianism—i.
Libet's studies were a follow-up to a neuroscientific discovery from the s, in particular, the discovery that voluntary decisions are associated with a certain kind of brain activity known as the readiness potential see e. Libet's studies were designed to determine a timeline for the readiness potential, the conscious intention to act, and the act itself see e. In the main experiment, subjects sat facing a large clock that could measure time in ms, and they were told to flick their wrists whenever they felt an urge to do so and to note the exact time that they felt the conscious urge to move.
What Libet found was that the readiness potential—the physical brain activity associated with our decisions—arose about — ms before the conscious intention to act and about ms before the act itself. These results were immediately seen as raising a problem for free will. The argument against free will proceeds differently depending on the kind of free will that we have in mind.
In our case, we can see Libet's results as raising a problem for TDW-indeterminism. In particular, the idea here is that a TDW-indeterminism requires indeterminacy at the moment of conscious choice, but b the fact that our conscious decisions are preceded by nonconscious brain processes namely, the readiness potential seems to suggest that the neural mechanisms responsible for our decisions are already up and running before our conscious thinking enters the picture.
The problem with this reasoning is that it's not clear what the function of the readiness potential is. In particular, there is no evidence for the claim that, in torn decisions, the readiness potential is causally relevant to which option is chosen 9 There are many other things that the readiness potential could be doing. One way to see that this is true is to recall from section 3 that NE-libertarianism is perfectly consistent with the idea that various aspects of our torn decisions are causally determined.
In particular, as we saw above, a torn decision could be TDW-undetermined and NEL-free even if it was determined in advance that i the torn decision in question was going to occur, and ii the choice was going to come from among the agent's tied-for-best options, and iii the objective moment-of-choice probabilities of these options being chosen were all more or less even. The only thing that needs to be undetermined, in order for a torn decision to be TDW-undetermined and NEL-free, is which tied-for-best option is chosen.
Given this, it should be obvious how NE-libertarians can respond to the Libet studies. They can say that for all we know, it could be that the readiness potential is part of a process that's causally relevant to our torn decisions but doesn't causally influence which tied-for-best option is chosen. For instance, it could be part of a causal process that leads to the occurrence of a torn decision without influencing which tied-for-best option is chosen 10 Or it could be that the readiness potential is part of the process whereby our reasons cause our decisions; and it could be that while in connection with certain kinds of non-torn decisions this process determines which option is chosen, in connection with torn decisions, it merely causes the choice to come from the agent's tied-for-best options and perhaps also causes the objective moment-of-choice probabilities of these options being chosen to be more or less even.
So the point here is that we don't presently have good reason to think that, in torn decisions, the readiness potential is causally relevant to which tied-for-best option is chosen.
There just isn't any evidence for this, and so the existence of the readiness potential gives us no reason to think that, in torn decisions, which tied-for-best option is chosen is causally affected by prior-to-choice nonconscious brain processes. Modern science, however, draws a picture that is quite different.
The world according to nineteenth century science was, broadly, as follows. Very small particles of matter move about in virtually empty three-dimensional space. These particles act on one another with forces that are uniquely determined by their positioning and velocities. The forces of interaction, in their turn, uniquely determine, in accordance with Newton's laws, the subsequent movement of particles. Thus each subsequent state of the world is determined, in a unique way, by its preceding state.
In such a world there was no room for freedom: it was illusory. Human beings, themselves merely aggregates of particles, had as much freedom as wound-up watch mechanisms.
In the twentieth century the scientific worldview underwent a radical change. It has turned out that subatomic physics cannot be understood within the framework of the Naive Realism of the preceding scientists.
The Theory of Relativity and, especially, Quantum Mechanics require that our worldview be based on a critical scientific philosophy, according to which all our theories and mental pictures of the world are only devices to organise and foresee our experience, and not the images of the world as it "really" is.
Thus along with the twentieth-century's specific discoveries in the physics of the micro-world, we should consider the emergence of a properly critical philosophy as a scientific discovery, and as one of the greatest scientific discoveries of the twentieth century. We also know that determinism, i.
On the contrary, freedom, which was banned from the science of the nineteenth century as an illusion, became a part, if not the essence, of reality. The mechanistic worldview saw the laws of nature as something that uniquely prescribes how events should develop, with indeterminacy resulting only from our lack of knowledge; contemporary science regards the laws of nature as only restrictions imposed on a basically non-deterministic world.
It is not an accident that the most general laws of nature are conservation laws, which do not prescribe how things must be, but only put certain restrictions or constraints upon them. There is genuine freedom in the world. When we observe it from the outside, it takes the form of quantum-mechanical unpredictability; when we observe it from within, we call it our free will.
We know that the reason why our behaviour is unpredictable from the outside is that we have ultimate freedom of choice. This freedom is the very essence of our personalities, the treasure of our lives. It is given us as the first element of the world we come into. Logically, the concept of free will is primary, impossible to derive or to explain from anything else.
The concept of necessity, including the concept of a natural law, is a derivative: we call necessary, or predetermined, those things which cannot be changed at will, or by will. Most people, if asked, would like genuine freedom of choice, proper free will, but can we really have it?
Philosophy offers a more complex analysis of this issue than the general scientific view outlined above. Within the philosophical tradition, and given the general set of philosophical principles belonging to this tradition, there are two main strands of argument for free will, i ethical and, ii psychological.
It is the set of psychological considerations that concern us more directly here, though, of course the ethical concerns are always present in the background to any debate. As the main features of the doctrine of free will have been sketched in the history of the problem, a very brief account of the argument for moral freedom will now suffice.
Will, where viewed as a free power, is defined by defenders of free will as the capacity of self-determination. By self is here understood not a single present mental state William James , nor a series of mental states David Hume and JS Mill , but an abiding rational being which is the subject and cause of these states.
We should distinguish between:. Spontaneous acts and desires are opposed to coaction or external compulsion, but they are not thereby morally free acts.
They may still be the necessary outcome of the nature of the agent as, e. The essential feature of free volition is the element of choice - the vis electiva, as St.
There is a concomitant interrogative awareness in the form of the query "Shall I acquiesce or shall I resist? It is this act of consent or approval, which converts a mere involuntary impulse or desire into a free volition and makes me accountable for it. A train of thought or volition deliberately initiated or acquiesced in, but afterward continued merely spontaneously, without reflective advertence to our elective adoption of it, remains free in causa for there was a choice, a free choice, about bringing it about.
I am therefore responsible for it, though actually the process has passed into the department of merely spontaneous or automatic activity. A large part of the operation of carrying out a resolution, once the decision is made, is commonly of this kind.
The question of free will may now be stated thus. Libertarians, indeterminists and anti-determinists reply "No" to it. The mind or soul in deliberate actions is a free cause.
Impressive evidence accumulated for the importance of each factor. Whether scientists supported one, the other, or a mix of both, they increasingly assumed that our deeds must be determined by something.
In recent decades, research on the inner workings of the brain has helped to resolve the nature-nurture debate—and has dealt a further blow to the idea of free will.
But there is also agreement in the scientific community that the firing of neurons determines not just some or most but all of our thoughts, hopes, memories, and dreams.
We know that changes to brain chemistry can alter behavior—otherwise neither alcohol nor antipsychotics would have their desired effects. The same holds true for brain structure: Cases of ordinary adults becoming murderers or pedophiles after developing a brain tumor demonstrate how dependent we are on the physical properties of our gray stuff.
Many scientists say that the American physiologist Benjamin Libet demonstrated in the s that we have no free will. The conscious experience of deciding to act, which we usually associate with free will, appears to be an add-on, a post hoc reconstruction of events that occurs after the brain has already set the act in motion.
The 20th-century nature-nurture debate prepared us to think of ourselves as shaped by influences beyond our control. But it left some room, at least in the popular imagination, for the possibility that we could overcome our circumstances or our genes to become the author of our own destiny.
The challenge posed by neuroscience is more radical: It describes the brain as a physical system like any other, and suggests that we no more will it to operate in a particular way than we will our heart to beat. The contemporary scientific image of human behavior is one of neurons firing, causing other neurons to fire, causing our thoughts and deeds, in an unbroken chain that stretches back to our birth and beyond.
In principle, we are therefore completely predictable. This research and its implications are not new. What is new, though, is the spread of free-will skepticism beyond the laboratories and into the mainstream.
The number of court cases, for example, that use evidence from neuroscience has more than doubled in the past decade—mostly in the context of defendants arguing that their brain made them do it. Determinism, to one degree or another, is gaining popular currency. The skeptics are in ascendance. This development raises uncomfortable—and increasingly nontheoretical—questions: If moral responsibility depends on faith in our own agency, then as belief in determinism spreads, will we become morally irresponsible?
And if we increasingly see belief in free will as a delusion, what will happen to all those institutions that are based on it? In , two psychologists had a simple but brilliant idea: Instead of speculating about what might happen if people lost belief in their capacity to choose, they could run an experiment to find out. Kathleen Vohs, then at the University of Utah, and Jonathan Schooler, of the University of Pittsburgh, asked one group of participants to read a passage arguing that free will was an illusion, and another group to read a passage that was neutral on the topic.
Then they subjected the members of each group to a variety of temptations and observed their behavior. Yes, indeed. When asked to take a math test, with cheating made easy, the group primed to see free will as illusory proved more likely to take an illicit peek at the answers. It seems that when people stop believing they are free agents, they stop seeing themselves as blameworthy for their actions. Consequently, they act less responsibly and give in to their baser instincts.
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